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Abstract
This paper introduces a class of games, called unit-sphere games, where strategies are real
vectors with unit 2-norms (or, on a unit-sphere). As a result, they can no longer be interpreted
as probability distributions over actions, but rather be thought of as allocations of one unit of
resource to actions and the multiplicative payoff effect on each action is proportional to square-
root of the amount of resource allocated to that action. The new definition generates a number
of interesting consequences. We first characterize sufficient and necessary conditions under
which a two-player unit-sphere game has a Nash equilibrium. The characterization effectively
reduces solving a unit-sphere game to finding all eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the product
of individual payoff matrices. For any unit-sphere game with non-negative payoff matrices,
there always exists a unique Nash equilibrium; furthermore, the unique equilibrium is efficiently
reachable via Cournot adjustment. In addition, we show that any equilibrium in positive unit-
sphere games corresponds to approximate equilibria in the corresponding normal-form games.
Analogous but weaker results are extended to positive n-player unit-sphere games.
1 Introduction
Consider the following two games.
Example 1. Protecting Manhattan. Two police stations try to protect Manhattan (could be visual-
ized as a rectangle) from a two-dimensional terrorist attack. Station A is responsible for protecting
all the streets, i.e., the horizontal paths across the rectangle; while station B is responsible for
protecting all the avenues, i.e., the vertical paths. Each police station has one unit of police force,
distributes optimally its force among its paths, and derives a positive utility uAij (resp. u
B
ij) from
successfully protecting each subway station Sij, namely, the intersections of street i and avenue j.
The probability of successfully protecting a subway station is
√
aibj , where ai and bj are the amount
of police force station A and B allocates to street i and avenue j respectively.
Example 2. Graphical ads for combinatorial queries. Consider a situation where a user submits a
query (say, “Yellow Stone national park”) to a travel website. The query triggers interests from two
complementary advertisement agencies: one has a collection of hotel ads and the other airline ads.
The website allocates two regions on its homepage, each with one unit of area, to the two groups of
ads respectively. Agency A, with a set of hotel ads, tries to fill in the first region with graphical ads
of hotels, similar for agency B and airline ads for the second region. Each agency derives positive
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utility uAij (resp. u
B
ij) if the user successfully purchases a combination of (hotel i, airline j). Note
that here agency A’s utility may depend on j since payment rule may involve both i and j. The
probability that the user purchases the combination is
√
aibj , where ai and bj are the areas A and
B allocate to hotel ad i and airline ad j respectively (so
√
ai is roughly the height or width of ad i).
At first glance, both games resemble a general version of Blotto game [8], thus nontrivial to
solve. However, a close scrutiny reveals an interesting pattern: both games be modeled as normal-
form games where players need to allocate one unit of resources to actions and the payoff effect
on each action is proportional to the square-root of amount of resource allocated to that action.
As we shall see, both examples are instances of positive unit-sphere games, which possess unique,
learnable pure Nash equilibria.
2 Unit-sphere games
Most of the paper deals with 2-player unit-sphere games. In Section 6, this definition is extended
to accommodate any number of players.
Definition 1. A two-player unit-sphere game (USG) is defined by two matrices A×B, where
• A is an m× n payoff matrix for player 1,
• B is an n×m payoff matrix for player 2.
A unit-sphere strategy x for player 1 is a column vector of real numbers such that x ∈
R
m, ‖x‖2 = 1, while a strategy y for player 2 is a column vector of real numbers such that
x ∈ Rn, ‖y‖2 = 1. Given a strategy profile (x, y), the utility obtained by player 1 is xTAy while
the utility of player 2 is yTBx. Other game-theoretical notions, such as best response and Nash
equilibrium, follow standard definitions.
Mathematically, the above definition is a 2-player normal-form game except for the definition
of strategy, where the restriction of unit L1-norm is now replaced by unit L2-norm. In other words,
each unit-sphere strategy is a point on a unit sphere, rather than a probability distribution. This
also implies that both x and y can be negative on some coordinates, as long as they are on a unit
sphere.
It is important to note that a USG can just be thought of as a standard normal-form game where
each pure strategy corresponds to a unit-sphere strategy and there are infinite many such strategies.
From this perspective, the characterization theorems (Theorems 3.1, 3.3, 3.4) are sufficient and
necessary conditions for a large class of games to have (unique) pure Nash equilibria.
In this paper, we do not consider randomized unit-sphere strategies, for the following reasons.
First of all, a randomization over unit-sphere strategies is no longer a unit-sphere strategy, thus
not well-defined under our new definition. Secondly, it is not hard to see that such a randomized
strategy has a L2-norm less than 1 and is always utility-dominated by some unit-sphere strategy.
Last but not least, we are interested in comparing unit-sphere strategy (which is somewhat mixed)
to standard mixed strategy, in terms of existence and computation efficiency of Nash equilibrium.
Adding another level of mixture makes the comparison less interesting.
One can also view players in a USG as risk averse agents whose payoffs, when facing a lottery
outcome, are not linear expectations of their utilities on deterministic outcomes in the lottery, but
concave expectations (in our case, a square-root function). In general, games with concave utility
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agents possess a mixed Nash equilibrium and it is in general PPAD-hard to compute such an
equilibrium [4, Theorem 1]. Our model and results does not follow from Fiat and Papadimitriou in
that, firstly, we allow for negative strategies, i.e., x and y can have negative entries, thus the whole
strategy set is not necessarily convex, precluding a Nash style proof; secondly, when restricting to
non-negative strategies, under the additional assumption of positive payoff matrices, we are able to
show that a unique Nash equilibrium exists and easy to compute. Readers are referred to [4] and
the references therein for an introduction on non-linear expectations.
Finally, in our definition, adding a positive constant to each payoff matrix cell no longer yields
an equivalent USG. Intuitively, when adding a large constant to a player’s payoff function, the
player has more incentive to distribute her resource evenly among pure strategies. So, it loses
generality to restrictions on positive payoff matrices. On the other hand, USGs are scale-invariant
in the sense that multiplying a constant to a player’s payoff function yields an equivalent USG.
3 Nash Equilibria in USGs
In this section, we characterize sufficient and necessary conditions for Nash equilibrium (NE) to
exist in USGs. In particular, equilibrium exists in all the USGs with positive payoff matrices. It is
unique and efficiently computable, via a well-known learning process known as Cournot adjustment.
3.1 Structure of NE in USGs
Let us now consider NE in a USG A×B. It is easy to see that the utilities of the two players are
u1 = x
TAy = ‖Ay‖2 cosα,
u2 = y
TBx = ‖Bx‖2 cos β,
respectively, where α denotes the angle between x and Ay and β denotes the angle between y and
Bx.1 Since both x and y are on the unit-sphere, a strategy profile (x, y) forms an NE if and only if
x = argmax
x′
x′TAy ⇐⇒ α = 0 ⇐⇒ λx = Ay,
and
y = argmax
y′
y′TBx ⇐⇒ β = 0 ⇐⇒ µy = Bx,
where λ = ‖Ay‖2, µ = ‖Bx‖2.
By this observation, we have a necessary condition of existence of NE for two-player USGs.
Lemma 1. Let A and B be the matrices of a USG. If AB and BA do not share a nonnegative
eigenvalue, the USG does not have an NE.
Proof. We show that an NE exists only if AB and BA share a nonnegative eigenvalue. Consider
payoff matrices A and B. For a NE profile (x, y),
Bλx = BAy ⇒ λµy = BAy,
Aλy = ABx⇒ λµx = ABx.
In other words, x is an eigenvector of AB with eigenvalue λµ, and y is an eigenvector of BA with
eigenvalue λµ.
1When Ay = 0 (resp. Bx = 0), one may set α (resp. β) arbitrarily.
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Since AB and BA have the same set of eigenvalues, the following theorem characterizes the
sufficient and necessary condition for an NE to exist in any two-player USG.
Theorem 3.1. Let A and B be the matrices of an USG. There exists an NE for the USG if and
only if AB (or BA) has a nonnegative eigenvalue λ ≥ 0.
Proof. The only-if direction follows from Lemma 1. We now prove the if direction. Assume AB
has a nonnegative eigenvalue λ with eigenvector x such that ‖x‖2 = 1.
• If Bx 6= 0, let y = Bx‖Bx‖2 . (x, y) is an NE for the game, because λ‖Bx‖2x = Ay, and ‖Bx‖2y =
Bx.
• If Bx = 0, y 6= 0 can be chosen such that either Ay = kx for some k > 0, when detA 6= 0,
or Ay = 0, when detA = 0. Also we assume ‖y‖2 = 1. Again (x, y) is an NE for the game,
because kx = Ay for some k ≥ 0, and the utility of player 2, yTBx, is always 0.
As stated in Theorem 3.1, to solve an USG A × B, i.e., to find all NEs or to ensure that no
NE exists, it is equivalent to calculate all eigenvalues of AB and the corresponding eigenvectors.
Solving USGs is therefore effectively reduced to the eigenvalue problem, for which one may refer to
the standard Singular value decomposition. We refer readers to [9] for more efficient algorithms.
3.2 Positive USGs
We now focus on a general class of USGs where there always exists a unique NE.
Definition 2. A USG A×B is positive if A,B > 0, and any strategy satisfies x, y ≥ 02.
Positive USGs (PUSGs) have many interesting properties that general USGs do not necessarily
possess. Before we state these properties, we need the following lemma from linear algebra.
Lemma 2. (Perron-Frobenius [1]): For any square matrix A > 0, we have
• A has an eigenvalue λ > 0. Moreover, for any other eigenvalue µ of A, |λ| > |µ|. We call λ
the Perron-Frobenius value, or spectral radius of A, denoted as λ = ρ(A).
• The eigenvalue λ has algebraic and geometric multiplicity one.
• There is an eigenvector x > 0 of A with an eigenvalue of λ.
• The only positive eigenvectors of A have the form kx for some k > 0. Moreover, all positive
eigenvectors have corresponding eigenvalue λ.
Lemma 3. For payoff matrices A > 0, B > 0, AB and BA share at least one positive eigenvalue,
which is their spectral radius.
2We say a matrix A > 0 if Aij > 0 for all (i, j), and a vector x ≥ 0 if xi ≥ 0 for all i.
4
Proof. Clearly, AB and BA are square matrices. Let x > 0 be an eigenvector of AB with eigenvalue
λ = ρ(AB) > 0, whose existence is guaranteed by Lemma 2. Note that
BA(Bx) = B(ABx) = λ(Bx).
Namely, Bx is an eigenvector of BA with eigenvalue λ. It follows that AB and BA share the same
positive eigenvalue λ > 0. Now suppose ρ(BA) > λ. By the same argument, we can see that ρ(BA)
is an eigenvalue of AB, a contradiction.
With Lemma 3, we are now able to derive two NEs for all PUSGs.
Theorem 3.2. There exists two NE (x1, y1), (x2, y2) for any PUSG, where
• x1 > 0 is the unit eigenvector of AB with eigenvalue λ = ρ(AB).
• y1 = Bx1‖Bx1‖2 .
where the utilities of the players obtained from (x1, y1) are
(
λ
‖Bx1‖2 , ‖Bx1‖2
)
.
• y2 > 0 is the unit eigenvector of BA with eigenvalue λ = ρ(BA).3
• x2 = Ay2‖Ay2‖2 .
where the utilities of the players obtained from (x2, y2) are
(
‖Ay2‖2, λ‖Ay2‖2
)
.
Proof. We prove for the case of (x1, y1). The case of (x2, y2) is symmetric. By Lemma 3, it is
always feasible to pick x1 as stated in the theorem. For player 1,
u1(x
′, y1) = x′TAy1 =
1
‖Bx1‖2x
′TABx1
=
λ
‖Bx1‖2x
′Tx1 ≤ λ‖Bx1‖2x
T
1 x1
=
λ
‖Bx1‖2 .
For player 2,
u2(x1, y
′) = y′TBx1 = y′T ‖Bx1‖2y1
≤ ‖Bx1‖2yT1 y1 = ‖Bx1‖2.
In other words, neither player has profitable deviation in (x1, y1).
Theorem 3.2 derives a pair of symmetric NEs for any PUSG. One might wonder whether the
two NEs are identical? This is indeed the case. We dedicate Subsection 3.3 to this result.
In fact, there is a symmetric NE in a PUSG if the payoff matrices satisfy certain additional
conditions. Before we state these conditions, we need the following technical lemma.
Lemma 4. For square matrices A > 0, B > 0 such that AB = BA, A and B share the same
one-dimensional eigenspace of spectral radius.
3Recall that ρ(AB) = ρ(BA)
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Proof. Let λ = ρ(A), x > 0 be an eigenvector of A whose corresponding eigenvalue is λ, then
A(Bx) = B(Ax) = λ(Bx),
namely Bx is an eigenvector of A whose eigenvalue is λ. By Lemma 2, the eigenspace of λ is
one-dimensional, which implies that Bx = µx for some µ. Again by Lemma 2, x belongs to the
eigenspace of the spectral radius of B, or equivalently µ = ρ(B).
If AB = BA, the corresponding PUSG has a symmetric NE.
Theorem 3.3. There is a symmetric NE (x, x) for any PUSG with square payoff matrices A×B
such that AB = BA. The NE utilities are (ρ(A), ρ(B)).
Proof. Let x > 0 be the unit eigenvector of A whose corresponding eigenvalue is ρ(A) (and therefore
the unit eigenvector of B whose eigenvalue is ρ(B)). For player 1,
u1(x
′, x) = x′TAx = ρ(A)x′Tx
≤ ρ(A)xTx = ρ(A).
For player 2,
u2(x
′, x) = x′TBx = ρ(B)x′Tx
≤ ρ(B)xTx = ρ(B).
Neither player has a profitable deviation in (x, x).
3.3 Uniqueness of NE in PUSGs
One of the most appealing properties of all PUSGs is that they have unique NE.
Theorem 3.4. Any PUSG has an unique NE.
Proof. Let (x, y) be an arbitrary NE of PUSG with payoff matrices A and B, whose existence has
been established in Theorem 3.2. By Lemma 1,
∃λ > 0, µ > 0, s.t. ABx = λx, BAy = µy
We will show that λ is the spectral radius of AB, and x is the corresponding positive unit eigen-
vector. The case of y is symmetric. Assume λ 6= ρ(AB). By Lemma 2, there must be some i ∈ [n]
such that xi = 0, since there are no other positive eigenvectors beside those of the spectral radius.
Note that λ > 0, AB > 0.
0 = λxi = (ABx)i =
∑
j
(AB)ijxj
≥ min(AB)ij‖x‖1 > 0,
a contradiction. Therefore λ = ρ(AB). Again by Lemma 2, the eigenspace of λ is one-dimensional.
Namely x is the unique positive eigenvector of λ such that ‖x‖2 = 1. The same argument works
for y. To conclude, we prove that (x, y) is the unique NE.
Corollary 1. Any PUSG has an unique NE, which has the form stated in Theorem 3.2. Moreover,
the two symmetric NEs in Theorem 3.2 are identical.
Next, we show the unique NE of a PUSG can be efficiently found via a natural learning process.
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4 Solving PUSGs via Cournot adjustments
In this section, we show that the unique NE of any PUSG can be resulted when both players follow
a well-known learning process called Cournot adjustments . This is remarkable property since it
states that players can learn to play NE even without any information of each other’s payoff matrix.
4.1 Cournot adjustments
Define Cournot adjustments as follows,
1. In the first round, each player i plays any positive strategy s0i > 0.
2. In round t, each player i observes st−i, the strategy of player −i.
3. In round t+ 1, each player i plays her best response against st−i. Namely
st+1i =
Ais
t
−i
‖Aist−i‖2
.
4. Iterate until no player updates her strategy.
Cournot adjustments define a natural protocol for players to learn to play a game over time.
It is appealing when players do not know others’ payoff matrices and for whatever reason that
the players cannot perform equilibrium computation upfront. It is known that, for any standard
games, a carefully designed better response dynamics can converge to some mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium (aka. Nash’s proof), but may take exponential number of rounds. In the following,
we show that this procedure thoroughly exploits the properties of PUSGs and finds efficiently the
unique NE for any PUSG in logarithmic number of rounds with respect to initial error.
4.2 Convergence of Cournot adjustments in PUSGs
To formally state and prove the convergence result, we need the following proposition from numer-
ical analysis.
Lemma 5. (Convergence of power iteration [7]): For any positive square matrix A whose eigenvalue
with the largest modulus is λ and the corresponding eigenspace is E, let x0 be an arbitrary unit vector
such that x is not orthogonal to E. Let
xt =
Axt−1
‖Axt−1‖2 .
It is guaranteed that xt converges to x∗, where Ax∗ = λx∗. Moreover,
∀p ∈ Z+ ∪ {∞}, ∃r ∈ (0, 1), c ∈ R+, s.t.
‖xt − x∗‖p ≤ crt.
In presence of Lemma 5, we now state a convergence result of best response dynamics in PUSGs.
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Theorem 4.1. If both players follow Cournot adjustment, the strategy sequence (xt, yt) converges
to the unique NE of the PUSG with an exponentially decreasing error. Or in other words, there is
a linear convergence4 for (xt, yt) to the NE, following Cournot adjustment.
Proof. Let A and B be the payoff matrices. We can explicitly derive the strategy expressions of
Cournot adjustments in round t as follows,
xt = Ayt−1, yt = Bxt−1.
It follows that
x2k = (AB)kx0, y2k = (BA)ky0, ∀k ∈ N.
Since we choose x0 > 0, y0 > 0, by Lemma 2, it is impossible that x0 (resp. y0) is orthogonal to
the eigenspace of the spectral radius of AB (resp. BA). By Lemma 5, as k grows, x2k converges to
the positive unit eigenvector of AB exponentially fast, and y2k converges to that of BA. Therefore
(x2k, y2k) converges to the unique PSNE exponentially fast. As (x2k, y2k) converges, (x2k+1, y2k+1)
converges as well, concluding the proof.
5 Approximating mixed-strategy equilibrium in standard games
via USGs
It is well-known that computing a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) in standard two-player
games is PPAD-complete [3]. In this section, we show that our understanding of USG can help us
to compute an approximate MSNE for any standard games.
5.1 Approximation Scheme
Consider any PUSG. By theorems we have derived so far, one can easily compute the unique NE
(x, y) of the PUSG. We now normalize x and y to be x′ and y′, so that ‖x′‖1 = ‖y′‖1 = 1. Our main
finding is that (x′, y′) is a multiplicative O
(√
max(m,n)
)
-approximate MSNE5 for the underlying
standard two-player game.
Call this approximation scheme the simple approximate scheme.
5.2 Approximation via simple approximate scheme
Once again, before we state and prove our result, we need the following technical lemma.
Lemma 6.
min
x∈Rn, ‖x‖1=1
{ ‖x‖22
‖x‖∞
}
=
2√
n+ 1
.
4Linear convergence is another way of saying the error diminishes exponentially fast in the number of iterations.
5A multiplicative k-approximate MSNE denotes a strategy profile where no player can improve her utility by k
times via deviation.
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Proof. Let t = ‖x‖∞ ≥ 1n . Obviously,
‖x‖22
‖x‖∞ ≥
t2 + (n− 1)
(
1−t
n−1
)2
t
=
n
n− 1 t−
2
n− 1 +
1
t(n− 1)
≥ 2√
n+ 1
.
We are now ready to state our main result of the section.
Theorem 5.1. For any standard two-player game with payoff matrices A and B, the simple ap-
proximation scheme yields a multiplicative O
(√
max(m,n)
)
-approximate MSNE, where m is the
number of rows of A, and n is the number of rows of B.
Proof. Let (x, y) be the NE of the induced PUSG over payoff matrices A × B, and (x′, y′) be the
normalized vectors, as stated in the simple scheme. Since (x, y) is an NE in the PUSG, ∃λ, µ, s.t.
Ay′ = λx′, Bx′ = µy′.
Consider player one’s payoff with or without deviation.
Without deviation, she gets
u1(x
′, y′) = x′TAy′ = λ‖x′‖22.
By deviation, she gets
max
‖x1‖1=1
u1(x1, y
′) = max
‖x1‖1=1
xT1Ay
′
= λ max
‖x1‖1=1
xT1 x
′ = λ‖x′‖∞.
By Lemma 6,
min
(x′,y′)
u1(x
′, y′)
max‖x1‖1=1 u1(x1, y′)
= min
(x′,y′)
‖x′‖22
‖x′‖∞ ≥
1√
m
+
m− 2√m+ 1√
m(m− 1)
= Ω
(
1√
m
)
.
Symmetrically, for player two, the approximate factor becomes Ω
(
1√
n
)
.
6 Multiplayer PUSGs
Definition 3. An m-player PUSG is defined as (A1, . . . , Am), where Ak =
(
Aki1,...,im
)
is the game
tensor for player k, such that Aki1,...,im > 0 for all i1 ∈ [n1], . . . , im ∈ [nm].
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6.1 Existence of NE in multiplayer PUSGs
Lemma 7. (Brouwer’s fixed point theorem): For any n ∈ Z+, Ω ⊆ Rn which is compact and
convex, f : Ω→ Ω which is continuous, there is some x∗ ∈ Ω such that f(x∗) = x∗.
Theorem 6.1. There exists an NE for any m-player PUSG (A1, . . . , Am).
The proof resembles that of the existence of MSNE in normal form games.
Proof. Let
si =
∑
j≤i
nj,
R
sm ⊃ Ω =
{
x ∈ Rsm
∣∣∣xi,j ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [m], j ∈ [ni], ‖xi‖1 = 1∀i ∈ [m]
}
.
For all x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Ω,
f(x) =
(
A1x2x3 . . . xm
‖A1x2x3 . . . xm‖1 ,
A2x1x3 . . . xm
‖A2x1x3 . . . xm‖1 , . . . ,
Amx1x2 . . . xm−1
‖Amx1x2 . . . xm−1‖1
)
.
It is easy to verify that Ω and f satisfy the conditions in Lemma 7. Therefore there is some x∗ =
(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
m) satisfying f(x
∗) = x∗, which implies that there is some λi such that Aix∗1 . . . x
∗
m = λix
∗
i
for all i. So
(
x∗
1
‖x∗
1
‖2 , . . . ,
x∗m
‖x∗m‖2
)
is an MSNE of the PUSG.
Note that, this theorem also follows from [4, Theorem 1].
6.2 Subclasses of multiplayer PUSGs
In this subsection, we investigate several subclasses of multiplayer PUSGs where NE is easy to find.
6.2.1 Symmetric PUSGs with even number of players
First we give an algorithm that solves m-player symmetric PUSGs when m is even.
Definition 4. An m-player symmetric PUSG is a PUSG where Ai = Aj for all i, j ∈ [m], and
Aki1,...,im = A
k
σ(i1),...,σ(im)
for all k ∈ [m] and σ ∈ Sn, where Sn is the permutation group and n is
the number of actions of each player.
The method used to find NE is symmetric PUSG is called SS-HOPM. SS-HOPM outputs a
symmetric NE with a particular payoff (which equals the largest Z-eigenvalue of the payoff tensor).
The linear convergence of SS-HOPM has been shown originally in [5] and revised in [2].
The algorithm performs as the following.
1. Choose x0 > 0, and the shift constant α = ⌈m∑i1,...,im Ai1,...,im⌉.
2. Let yt+1 = A(xt)m−1 + αxt.
3. Compute
xt+1 =
yt+1
‖yt+1‖2 , λ
t+1 = A(xt+1)m.
As shown in [2], xt converges to an symmetric PSNE x∗ while λt converges to the payoff of each
player playing x∗.
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6.2.2 Markov PUSGs via Cournot Adjustments
Generalizing [6], we show that a unique PSNE exists in any Markov PUSG, which can be efficiently
achieved via Cournot adjustments.
Definition 5. An Markov PUSG (A1, . . . , Am) is a PUSG such that
∑
ik
Aki1,...,im = ck
for all k ∈ [m], i1 ∈ [n1], . . . , ik−1 ∈ [nk−1], ik+1 ∈ [nk+1], . . . , im ∈ [nm] and a constant ck.
In words, Markov PUSG is a subset of PUSG such that, fixing any other players’ strategy
profile, the sum of player k’s utility over all his/her actions is a constant, for any k. Since every
Markov PUSG can be scaled such that for all k, ck = 1, it is without loss of generality to consider
only those games.
Lemma 8. For nonnegative x1, . . . , xm such that ‖xi‖1 = 1, we have ‖Akx1 . . . xk−1xk+1 . . . xn‖1 =
1 for all k ∈ [m].
Proof.
‖Akx1 . . . xk−1xk+1 . . . xn‖1
=
∑
ik
∑
i1,...,ik−1,ik+1,...,im
Aki1,...,imx1,i1 . . . xk−1,ik−1xk+1,ik+1 . . . xm,im
=
∑
i1,...,ik−1,ik+1,...,im
∑
ik
Aki1,...,imx1,i1 . . . xk−1,ik−1xk+1,ik+1 . . . xm,im
=
∑
i1,...,ik−1,ik+1,...,im
x1,i1 . . . xk−1,ik−1xk+1,ik+1 . . . xm,im
= 1
Lemma 9. Let Ω be as defined above, f : Ω→ Ω be such that for v ∈ Ω,
f(v)k = A
kv1 . . . vk−1vk+1 . . . vm.
For x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Ω, y = (y1, . . . , ym) ∈ Ω,
‖f(x)k − f(y)k‖1 ≤ (1− δk)

 ∑
i∈[m], i 6=k
‖xi − yi‖1

 ,
where
δk = min
V⊆[nk]

 min
i1,...,ik−1,ik+1,...,im
∑
ik∈V
Aki1,...,im + mini1,...,ik−1,ik+1,...,im
∑
ik∈V ′
Aki1,...,im

 ,
and V ′ = [nk] \ V .
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Proof.
∑
ik∈Vk
(f(x)k,ik − f(y)k,ik)
=
∑
ik∈Vk
∑
i1,...,ik−1,ik+1,...,im
Ai1,...,im(x1,i1 . . . , xk−1,ik−1 , xk+1,ik+1 , . . . , xm,im−
y1,i1 . . . , yk−1,ik−1 , yk+1,ik+1 , . . . , ym,im)
=
∑
ik∈Vk
∑
i1,...,ik−1,ik+1,...,im
Ai1,...,im [(x1,i1 − y1,i1)x2,y2 . . . , xm,im+
y1,i1(x2,i2 − y2,i2)x3,i3 . . . xm,im + · · · + y1,i1 . . . ym−1,im−1(xm,im − ym,im)].
Let Vk ⊆ [nk] be the largest set such that ∀ik ∈ Vk, f(x)k,ik > f(y)k,ik , V1 ⊆ [n1] the largest
set such that ∀i1 ∈ V1, x1,i1 > y1,i1 . Note that by Lemma 8, ‖xk‖1 = ‖yk‖1 = 1, and hence∑
ik
xk,ik − yk,ik = 0 for all k ∈ [m]. We then have
∑
i1,...,ik−1,ik+1,...,im
∑
ik∈Vk
Ai1,...,im(x1,i1 − y1,i1)y2,i2 . . . , ym,im
=
∑
i1∈V1
∑
i2,...,ik−1,ik+1,...,im
∑
ik∈Vk
Ai1,...,im(x1,i1 − y1,i1)y2,i2 . . . , ym,im+
∑
i1 /∈V1
∑
i2,...,ik−1,ik+1,...,im
∑
ik∈Vk
Ai1,...,im(x1,i1 − y1,i1)y2,i2 . . . , ym,im
≤
∑
i1∈V1
∑
i2,...,ik−1,ik+1,...,im

 max
j1∈V1,j2,...,jm
∑
jk∈Vk
Aj1,...,jm

 (x1,i1 − y1,i1)y2,i2 . . . , ym,im−
∑
i1 /∈V1
∑
i2,...,ik−1,ik+1,...,im

 min
j1∈V1,j2,...,jm
∑
jk∈Vk
Aj1,...,jm

 (y1,i1 − x1,i1)y2,i2 . . . , ym,im
=

 max
j1∈V1,j2,...,jm
∑
jk∈Vk
Aj1,...jm − min
j1∈V1,j2,...,jm
∑
jk∈Vk
Aj1,...,jm

×
∑
i1 /∈V1
∑
i2,...,ik−1,ik+1,...,im
(y1,i1 − x1,i1)y2,i2 . . . yk−1,ik−1yk+1,ik+1 . . . ym,im
≤

1− min
j1,...,jm
∑
jk /∈Vk
Aj1,...,jm − min
j1,...,jm
∑
jk∈Vk
Aj1,...,jm

 ∑
i1 /∈V1
(y1,i1 − x1,i1)
≤ 1
2
(1− δk)‖x1 − y1‖1.
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We therefore get
‖f(x)k − f(y)k‖1 = 2
∑
ik∈Vk
(f(x)k,ik − f(y)k,ik)
≤ 2
∑
i 6=k
[
1
2
(1− δk)‖xi − yi‖1
]
= (1− δk)

∑
i 6=k
‖xi − yi‖1

 .
Theorem 6.2. There exists an unique NE in any Markov PUSG where δk >
m−2
m−1 for all k.
Proof. Assume there are two distinct NE in an m-player game (A1, . . . , Am), x0 and y0. Let
x = x0‖x0‖1 , y =
y0
‖y0‖1 . By Lemma 9,
‖x− y‖1
=
∑
k
‖xk − yk‖1
=
∑
k
‖f(x)k − f(y)k‖1
≤
∑
k
∑
i 6=k
(1− δk) (‖xi − yi‖1)
<
∑
i∈[m]
(m− 1)
(
1− m− 2
m− 1
)
(‖xi − yi‖1)
=‖x− y‖1,
an contradiction.
Theorem 6.3. Cournot adjustments lead to the unique NE in any Markov PUSG where δk >
m−2
m−1
for all k.
Proof. For simplicity, we denote strategies by vectors whose L1-norm are scaled to 1 in the proof.
Consider a procedure where player k starts by playing x0k = (
1
nk
, . . . , 1nk
). Let x∗ be the unique
PSNE of the game, guaranteed to exist by Theorem 6.2. Let ǫ0 = maxi∈[m] ‖x0i − x∗i ‖1, δ =
maxi∈[m](1 − δi). Clearly, in round t, strategies of player k will be xtk = f(xt−1)k, where f is the
same as stated above.
On the other hand, as shown in Lemma 9,
‖xtk − x∗k‖1 ≤ δ

∑
i 6=k
‖xt−1i − x∗i ‖1

 , ∀t ∈ Z+, k ∈ [m].
By a simple induction, we prove that
ǫt = max
k
[‖xtk − x∗k‖1] ≤ (m− 1)tδtǫ0.
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When t = 0, it holds obviously that ǫ0 ≤ ǫ0. Assume that ǫt−1 ≤ (m− 1)t−1δt−1ǫ0, we may show,
ǫt = max
k
[‖xtk − x∗k‖1] ≤ max
k
δ

∑
i 6=k
‖xt−1i − x∗i ‖1

 ≤ δ(m− 1)ǫt−1 ≤ (m− 1)tδtǫ0.
It can be seen easily that ǫt goes to 0 exponentially fast considering that δ <
1
m−1 .
We have shown that the L1-norm normalized strategies converge to the L1-norm normalized
NE. It follows naturally that the strategies themselves converge to the unique NE. Morevoer, the
convergence is linear, i.e., the error decreases exponentially fast.
6.3 Multiplicity of NE in multiplayer USGs
In fact, there may be infinitely many NEs in a multiplayer USG. Here is an interesting example [2].
Example 3. Consider a 4-player USG where game tensors (A1, A2, A3, A4) are such that A11112 =
A12122 = A
2
1112 = A
2
1222 = A
3
1112 = A
3
2122 = A
4
1121 = A
4
2122 = 2, A
j
i1i2i3i4
= 0 otherwise. We consider
symmetric strategy x = (x1, x2). In order for x to be an NE, we need


2x21x2 = λx1
2x1x
2
2 = λx2
x21 + x
2
2 = 1
.
By setting λ = 2x1x2, it appears that any pair of (x1, x2) where x
2
1 + x
2
2 = 1 forms a symmetric
NE. Moreover, any equilibrium payoff λ ∈ [0, 1] can be achieved by some choice of (x1, x2).
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